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HABERMAS AMONG THE AMERICANS: SOME REFLECTIONS
ON THE COMMON LAW
CATHERINE KEMP*

In his Translator's Introduction to Jirgen Habermas's Between
Facts and Norms,' William Rehg notes that one of the challenges facing
the English translator is that the theory of law elaborated in this book
"deals with two different legal orders," 2 namely, "the American legal
system, influenced as it is by the English common-law tradition" and in
which "case law has always occupied a central position," and the German civil law.3 Rehg goes on to say that it is important not to overemphasize these differences,4 and certainly the fluidity with which the two
orders serve the analysis of Between Facts and Norms bears witness to
this view. In this essay, I suggest that Habermas's extension of his theory
of law to the American system involves challenges not only to translation
but also to a descriptive and philosophical account of American law. In
particular, the status of customary law in Habermas's theory and its relation to adjudication as he characterizes it do not capture either the nature
of the common law or, perhaps more importantly, its influence throughout the American system. This claim has implications for Habermas's
description of the relations between adjudication and the American constitutional system and for his account of the nature of American constitutional law.
This essay has two objectives. First, in the essay itself I want to
raise some questions about the fit between Habermas's theory of law and
the American system. These questions are intended to suggest lines of
inquiry merely and are perforce preliminary. I begin in Part I with an
extended review of Habermas's theory of adjudication, and then turn in
Part II to a summary of the place he assigns to custom and to customary
law. In Part III, I elicit a picture of the common law to illustrate the hy-
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. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE

THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996).

2. Id. at xxxiv.
3. Id.
4. Rehg notes that since its enactment, the German Civil Code--German private law--has
taken into itself the interpretations and adaptations of it made by the judiciary. ld;see also RUDOLPH
B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 592 (6th ed. 1998).
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pothesis that although the notion of "a system of customary law"' is not
appropriate, there is a deeply held and pervasive residue of common law
culture in American law-something I will call the 'custom of custom'
in adjudication, enactment, and interpretation. Finally, in Part IV, I consider a few implications this attention to the culture of the common law
may have for the theory of law presented in Between Facts and Norms.
Second, I hope that this discussion will provide American legal
scholars with a foothold in their assimilation of the analysis in Between
Facts and Norms to American jurisprudential debates. This second objective, the work of which lies beyond the present discussion, has its inspiration in my own sense that, absent a compelling picture of the influence of the common law, American jurisprudence misses its familiarly
contested territory. Contemporary as well as historical debates about
legal truth, certainty, legitimacy, indeterminacy, justice, justification,
adjudication, interpretation, federalism, and the relation of law to politics, economic theory, history, et cetera all revolve around issues of adjudication and of decisional law as (analytically) distinct from and related
to legislative enactment. Without an integration of the influence of the
common law and the "legal theory" Habermas offers us,' American jurisprudential concerns, even those that do not make their concern with
the common law explicit (and except for a handful of constitutional and
political questions), 7 generally lack an entrance point to Habermas's
claims about American law.
I. HERCULES' RETROFIT: ADJUDICATION IN THE DISCOURSE THEORY OF

LAW
At the beginning of chapter five, Habermas points out that a discourse theory of law must "first of all" prove itself at the level of the
legal system "in the narrow sense." 8 Thus considered, the legal system is
law insofar as it is engaged in the production and reproduction of law.9
To account for law in this sense, which always entails grappling with a
particular legal order, is the task of "legal theory."'" Although not exclusively devoted to adjudication, legal theory concerns itself primarily with

5. A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL
HISTORY 371 (1987).
6. See HABERMAS, supra note I, at 196.
7. See, e.g., id. at 267 (presenting questions raised by Frank Michelman and John Ely in
Habermas's discussion of the role of the United States Supreme Court).
8. Id. at 196.
9. This includes all interactions that are not only oriented to law, but are also geared to produce new law and reproduce law as law. To institutionalize the legal system in this sense requires the
self application of law in the form of secondary rules that constitute and confer the official powers to
make, apply, and implement law. See id.at 195. Habermas distinguishes this from the legal system
in the broad sense, which "includes all social communications that refer to law." Id.
10. Id. at 196.
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what judges do." At this level, the most important aspect of modem law,
namely, the tension between "facticity" and "validity,"' 2 appears for legal
theory as the problem of the rationality of adjudication.' 3 This problem is
best understood as that of reconciling legal certainty, or fidelity to existing law, with justice, the legitimacy of the application of law in a particular case. 4
Habermas notes that of all the efforts to reconcile these demands,
Ronald Dworkin's theory of the "rational reconstruction of the law of the
land" is the most promising. 5 In his own work Dworkin assigns this task
to an ideal judge he names Hercules, who is not limited in either time or
capacity.' 6 Hercules' job is to reread-as both activist and preservationist-the "institutional history"' 7 of his society in light of the principles
(of political morality) it contains in order to render the uniquely right

decision in a particular case.'" For Habermas, the figure of Hercules cut-

ting a lonely path 9 through the thickets of American law'" serves as the
launch pad for his retrofit of the ideal judge "as a member of the interpretation community of legal experts,"'" whose role in adjudication is to
instantiate communicatively achieved acceptance of validity claims.22
What does this mean? In the rather tortuous synthesis of section 5.3,
Habermas preserves two elements of Dworkin's theory: (1) the notion of

11. See id. at 197. Habermas's rationale for this claim resides in the premise that "all legal
communications refer to actionable claims" so that "court decisions provide the perspective from
which the legal system is analyzed." kd at 196-97.
12. The eponymous "facts" and "norms." Modem society, as Habermas sees it, suffers from a
splitting apart of traditional law and conventional morality. In pre-modem society, according to this
view, law, morality, and ethical life enjoyed a unified foundation in the authority of the Church.
With the increasing secularization and pluralization of society in the modem era, these authorities
lost their "sacred foundation." Modem law is institutionalized ("facticity") and morality is merely a
form of cultural knowledge, so that the "validity" of law is problematic. Habermas characterizes this
as a tension immanent to law between facts and norms. See id. at 106-07. Habermas associates premodem law with natural law theory. See id. at 199. For an American reflection on this attribution of
this tension to law, see Frederic Kellogg, Review Essay, 81 NEWSL. OF THE SOC'Y FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF AM. PHIL., Oct. 1998, at 14-17.
13. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 197.
14. See id. Habermas also characterizes the tension to be reconciled as one between "consistent decisionmaking" and "rational acceptability" and also as between the "certainty" and the "rightness" of law. Id. at 198-99.
15. Id. at 197. Along with Dworkin's theory, Habermas considers "legal hermeneutics", legal
realism, and legal positivism. Id. at 197-203.
16. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977).
17. Id. at 120.
18. Seeid. at ll6.
19. On the suggestion of Professor Michelman, Habermas locates the limitations of Dworkin's
theory in the monologic character of Hercules' efforts. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 224.
20. Cf William H. Rehg, Translator's Introduction to HABERMAS, supra note 1, at xxxiv
(noting Karl Llewellyn's notion of the "bramble bush").
21. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 224.
22. See id. at 226. For a detailed account of communicative action, see Mitchell Aboulafia,
Law Professors Read Habermas, 76 DENY. U. L. REV. 943, 944-45 (1999).
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institutional history (as "unproblematic background assumptions")'3 and
(2) the personal role of the judge.24 First, institutional history brings with
it both the body of decisional and enacted law in relation to which the
judge's decision must be consistent25 and the democratically-justified
norms embedded therein.26 Second, Habermas's judge is not unlimited in
time or capacity like Hercules, but he brings with him a theory of argumentation which takes the place of Hercules' virtuosity.27 This theory of
argumentation is the product of the democratically-justified procedural
regulation of the judge. These rules of procedure, according to Habermas, "institutionally carve out an internal space for the free exchange of
arguments."29 The judge, presented with this exchange, adopts an ideal
role as an interlocutor in an uncoerced, truth-seeking discussion. This
position, as Habermas understands it, entails taking the perspectives of
every person involved in and affected by the decision so that the decision
is the outcome of an ideal conversation among communicatively ideal
participants.' The judge's decision is an impartial application of norms
to the case at hand.3 For these reasons,32 the decision is as far as possible
the right one, thereby answering the demand of "validity" in our

23. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 227.
24. "[E]ach participant in a trial, whatever her motives, contributes to a discourse thatfrom the
judge's perspective facilitates the search for an impartial judgment. This latter perspective alone,
however, is constitutive for grounding the decision." Id. at 231.
25. See id at 198.
26. "[A] discourse theory [starts] with the assumption that moral reasons enter into law via the
democratic procedure of legislation." d at 204.
27. See id. at 225.
28. See id. at 234.
29. Id. at 235. Note that by "internal" here, Habermas means internal to the judge. The parties
are advancing adversarially-positioned arguments and generally behaving very strategically, but for
the judge these appear as a free and uncoerced airing of (almost) all the arguments important to the
decision of the case. See id. at 230-31. As an example of such procedural regulation, Habermas cites
the German Code of Civil Procedure. See id. at 236-37.
30. This is very difficult to put simply. Here is the passage: "[W]hether norms and values
could find the rationally motivated assent of all those affected can be judged only from the intersubjectively enlarged perspective of the first-person plural. This perspective integrates the perspectives
of each participant's worldview and self-understanding in a manner that is neither coercive nor
distorting." Id. at 228. Further, "interpretations of the individual case, which are formed in light of a
coherent system of norms, depend on the communicative form of a discourse [which] allows the
perspectives of... uninvolved members of the community (representedby an impartialjudge) to be
transformed into one another." Id. at 229 (emphasis added). The picture here (roughly) is of adversarial, strategic parties flushing out a set of arguments on the matter in question before a judge who,
in virtue of his professional obligation, hears and thinks about these arguments as if he were the
entire affected community-shorn of coercion and distortion-seeking the right outcome of the case.
Because he is taking this position, the decision he renders has the highest chance of being the most

right.
31. See id. at 234.
32. Clearly, much remains implicit in this summary. A much less abbreviated although very
accessible summary of the theory of communicative action and its application to law can be had in
Richard A. Lynch, Distinguishing Between Legal and MoralNorms, 41 PHIL. TODAY 67 (1997). For
my purposes here the centrality and the nature of the role of the judge are most important.

HABERMAS AMONG THEAMERICANS

1999]

tension.33 Finally, because this free exchange of arguments takes place
against the "unproblematic" background of institutional history, its outcome via the judge's decision preserves as far as possible consistent decision-making-law' s "facticity."34
II. FAcTICITY: HABERMAS ON CUSTOM AND CUSTOMARY LAW
Habermas defines law as "modem enacted law., 35 His characterization of law's "facticity ' '36 suggests not only that decisional law is a kind
of enactment,37 but also that any residuum of a customary tradition in
institutional history has itself this status. 8 Unlike modem enacted law,
however, mere customs or conventions have "the organic facticity of
inherited forms of life., 39 This facticity has a kind of "de facto validity,"
which consists in the fact that a rule or norm is actually acted on and is
likely to be accepted by the people to whom it is addressed.' This de
facto legitimacy is independent of a belief on the part of the addressees
that a rule or norm is legitimate; the degree to which a particular requirement lacks belief in its legitimacy affects the extent to which it is
reinforced by "other factors" such as "intimidation, the force of circumstances, custom, and sheer habit. ' As we saw in Part I, Habermas's
legal theory understands law as the source of the rational acceptability
which is the modem form of this legitimacy.42 In the transition from premodem to modem society, "positive law separated from the customs and
habits that were devalued to mere conventions. This, as I pointed out
at the end of Part I, leaves the institutional history as unproblematic
background-facticity-for adjudication:"
An existing law is the product of an opaque web of past decisions by the legislature and the judiciary, and it can include traditions
of customary law as well. This institutional history of law forms the
33. See HABERMAS, supra note 1,at 227.
34. "[W]e bring argumentation to a de facto conclusion only when the reasons [offered in the
exchange] solidify against the horizon of unproblematic background assumptions into such a coherent whole that an uncoerced agreement on the acceptability of the disputed validity claim emerges."
Id. at 227.
35. Id. at 79.
36. "[T]he facticity of making and enforcing law." Id. at 447; see also Rehg, supra note 20, at
xii (discussing the "factual generation, administration, and enforcement" of law). Facticity is what is
given, that which can be taken as a fact or collection of things factual. Note that facts here are not
legal facts, distinct from law: under this more general notion of facticity, law in its various aspects is
itself a fact.
37. A claim common law theorists dispute. See SIMPSON, supranote 5, at 366-70.
38. See, e.g., HABERMAS, supra note 1,at 198.
39. Id. at 20, 30.
40. See id. at 29. Another type of de facto validity attaches to enacted law in virtue of its being
backed by threat of sanctions. For Habermas, the facticity of law under this construction is "artificially produced," by contrast with the "organic" character of custom, Id. at 30.
41.

Id.

42. See supranotes 29-31 and accompanying text.
43. HABERMAS, supra note 1,at 106.
44. See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
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background of every present-day practice of decision-making. The
positivity of law also reflects the contingencies of this original context of emergence. 45
As facticity, that is, as that in relation to which the communicative
activity of adjudication must try to make itself consistent, this background of institutional history is not 'in play' in adjudication. Past decisions are just that, past decisions, yielding-alongside legislation-truths
which require the fidelity of subsequent decisions made by judges. For
Habermas, to the extent that institutional history may owe some of its
content to "traditions of customary law," it is nevertheless not itself customary in nature. Further, because it serves as the background-unquestioned, unproblematic, out-of-play-for the discourse of adjudication, it
departs even from Dworkin's notion of the "gravitational" pull of precedent.'
Finally, it is reasonable to infer that Habermas's judge renders decisions that will be logged into the institutional history as that in relation to
which subsequent decisions must be consistent. His decision, its context,
and the procedural requirements which shape these are not driven by
custom and are not themselves customary. As instances of decisional
law, they are products of an alternative type of enactment, and take their
place beside legislation in the facticity of law.
III. THE 'CUSTOM OF CUSTOM': A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT THE COMMON

LAW CULTURE OF AMERICAN LAW
By way of contrast with Habermas's view of the place of customary
and common law as "facticity," in this section I want to be old-fashioned
for a moment, and draw a likely conclusion from a typical style of argument. Anglo-American legal theory has in many of its manifestations
claimed pride of place for adjudication and then gone on to ground

statements about the nature of law on accounts of the nature of adjudication. For this part of the essay, I claim not pride of place but certainly
tremendous importance for adjudication. Then I elicit a picture of adjudication in the American system which suggests that judges decide cases in
a customarily-delimited and custom-based context, a picture of adjudication which departs substantially from Habermas's. Finally I consider the
thesis that the character of common law adjudication as it appears in this
picture pervades and distinguishes American constitutional law as well.
A. Adjudication and the Common Law in the American System
In response to Realist, formalist, positivist, and natural law accounts
of adjudication and of the comrmon law, various legal theorists of different periods have held out for an account of the common law as a kind of
45.
46.

HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 198.
See DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 115.
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(perhaps highly systematized) customary law. 7 This would, it seems,
have a corollary in the claim that adjudication in jurisdictions heavily
influenced and pervaded by a common law culture owes its peculiar nature at least in part to the demands of rendering decisions in ways consonant with that culture;4' that is, common law adjudication is significantly-if residually-a customary and a custom-based activity. As I
noted above in Rehg's remarks about the challenges of translation,49
American law is heavily influenced and pervaded by the common law.
This means that the work of courts is essential and that the culture of
adjudication affects nearly every aspect of law," which is to say that
American law in all its aspects places significant reliance on customary
and/or custom-based forms and practices. For my purposes here, the
relevant aspects of customary law are its simultaneously stable and provisional or tentative character--common law rules can be 'in play' long
after they are settled-and the fact that there is implied in practices or
customs a kind of "emergent consensus"5 1 about a particular kind of
controversy.
The peculiar character of the common law has been described by
many in the history of legal theory, from Blackstone52 to Holmes. 3 Most
focus on the nature of case law, the doctrine of stare decisis, and the role
of the judge. Others focus on the customary (as distinct from the enacted)
aspect of the common law, which in a nutshell runs something like this:
law is "a system of customary law"54 consisting of two parts: first, a collection of practices "regularly observed" by a group for a long period of
time where this history of regular observance is regarded by the group as
the reason the practice is proper.5 These practices are the "customs" of
customary law. Second, alongside these practices there exist "complex
theoretical notions which both serve to explain and [to] justify the past
practice" and to guide future conduct. 6 The common law is not (contra
Legal Formalism) reducible to these propositions, rather, law as a sys47.

See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 5, at 373-76. See generally HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M.

SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994)

(analyzing the common law and the role of adjudication).
48. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 644-47 (reviewing the differences between common
law and civil law jurisdictions and their corollaries in differences in adjudication).
49. See also id.
50. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 196 (establishing the rationale for his focus on adjudication by stating that "all legal communications refer to actionable claims"). See generally HART &
SACKS, supra note 47 (arguing for centrality of adjudication and the mutual dependence of statutory
and decisional law).
51. Frederic R. Kellogg, Legal Scholarshipin the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism'sResponse to
Critical Legal Studies, 65 TuL. L. REV. 15, 29 (1990).
52.

53.
1(1870).
54.
55.
56.
57.

See generallyWILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1765).

See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangementof the Law, 5 AM. L. REV.
See Simpson, supra note 5, at 375.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 376.
See id.
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tem of customary law "consists of a body of practices observed and ideas
received."58 In this picture, what is customary about the common law is
the reliance for "time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary '59 on particular means of resolving disputes or ordering situations and on certain statements of these means as rationales for this reliance.
As Hart and Sacks point out in The Legal Process," a simple equation of the common law with custom does not take sufficient account of
its operation as an independent force in the law6 and, in particular, is not
suited to a rapidly changing legal system.62 Hart and Sacks see custom as
one dynamic among several at play in the American legal system.63 It is
nonetheless a vital and contemporary feature of American law-how,
then, does it work?'
In a recent treatment of the relevance of American Pragmatism to the
contemporary debates over legal indeterminacy, Frederic Kellogg elicits
a picture of Oliver Wendell Holmes's theory of law which does justice to
the variety and rate of growth in American law.65 Two features of
Holmes's legal theory concern us here: his notion of "successive approximation"" and the element of consensus he assigns to rules which
emerge in the common law.67 "Successive approximation" is the process
by which the packages6 8 of problems, responses, patterns, standards,
principles, values, and choices come to be reflected in the body of cases
from which rules emerge and then are "sifted" until a general rule 'takes
shape.'" Referring to Holmes's own account, Kellogg considers the example of new rules in tort for traffic cases:

58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 375 (quoting Blackstone) (citations omitted).

60.

HART & SACKS, supra note 47, at 435.

61. Id.at 427.
62. Id. at 429.
63. See, e.g., id. at 435 (presenting an account of adjudication when custom is unhelpful).
64.

Id.

65. See Kellogg, supra note 51, at 28. Kellogg says that "Legal indeterminacy might be
viewed as the residue from, or, more accurately, the impression we get from... the judiciary's
periodically concentrated experience with the tentativeness inherent in the enterprise of social ordering." l He suggests that for Holmes legal indeterminacy is "episodic" and has its origin not in
some aspect of the law, as H.L.A. Hart and the Legal Realists would have it, but rather in the patterns and standards of conduct which emerge in experience and are then taken up into law.
66. Id. at 24-25 (arguing that Holmes borrows this notion either directly or indirectly from
Charles Sanders Peirce).

67.

See id.
at 29.

68. Ethical principles and values, as well as choices involving policy, are not introduced into
rules through the medium of law, Rather they are implicated both in the development of standards of
conduct, which are in turn reflected in the decisions of cases in a given area of liability, and in the
development of the consensus from which the rule eventually emerges. See id. at 32.

69.

See id. at 24-25.
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The common law begins, just like scientific inquiry, with an external
problem-say, the invention of the wheel leads to the invention of the
carriage and thence, to the emergence of traffic, traffic accidents, and
the problem of resolving claims of people injured in traffic accidents.
Traffic cases, although long familiar and settled by rules, were once
original matters and initially resulted in little more than a bunch of
decisions, tentatively offered as a set of hypotheses as to how like
situations should be resolved. 70
According to Holmes, this bunch of cases yields a general rule only very
slowly:
It is only after a series of determinations on the same subject-matter,
that it becomes necessary to "reconcile the cases," as it is called, that
is, by a true induction to state the principle which has until then been
obscurely felt. And this statement is often modified more than once
by new decisions before the abstracted general rule takes its final
shape. 7'
The rule which emerges is not enacted by the judiciary, it is instead a
reflection of "developments external to law" of patterns and standards of
conduct evolving through "repeated experience with particular
disputes. 7 2
Once settled, rules can come into conflict. For Holmes, rules which
conflict define "poles" between which there is a clear distinction so that
as subsequent cases "cluster" around the poles and begin to approach
each other, the distinction becomes less clear:
[T]he determinations are made one way or the other on a very slight
preponderanceoffeeling rather than articulate reason; and at last a
mathematical line is arrived at by the contact of contrary decisions,
which is so far arbitrary that it might equally well have been drawn a
little further to the one side or to the other.... [Ilt is better to have a
line drawn somewhere in the penumbra between darkness and light,
than to remain in uncertainty.
Controversies arise in life outside the law, around which patterns and
later standards of conduct emerge. When these situations with all of their
aspects end up in court, adjudication is that process via which a kind of
provisional or emergent, if ultimately inveterate, consensus of practice or
70. Id.
71. Kellogg, supra note 51, at 25 (quoting Holmes).
72. Id. at 27-28. (explaining that "[o]nly after becoming implicated in standards established
through practical experience, reflected in (and to some extent affected by) multiple fact-based judicial determinations, are rules abstracted from experience by judges"); see also Simpson, supra note
5, at 367-68 (stating that "[t]he notion that the common law consists of rules which are the product
of a series of acts of legislation ... by judges... cannot be made to work... because common law
rules enjoy whatever status they possess not because of the circumstances of their origin, but because of their continued reception. [Judges']actions create precedents, but creating a precedent is
not the same thing as laying down the law." (emphasis added)).
73. Kellogg, supranote 51, at 28 (quoting Holmes).
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custom emerges. These practices in turn influence the shape and course
of adjudication and of its subsequent results, still with the same tentative
and yet stable character. Taken together these aspects give us Holmes's
model of the common law:
Law is given content (1) by the characterof urgent controversiesthat
require resolution, and find their way into the courts; (2) by the tendency of repetition to engender both accepted practices and standards
of conduct; and (3) by emergent consensus, not dominated by any
single judge, or even judges as a class, but including juries and many
actors outside the legal process who are engaged in the activities
which generate both patterns of conduct and controversy: farmers,
drivers, ship captains, bailors and bailees, landowners and tenants.74
In this picture, law's pedigree in the operation of custom and of
custom-based forms does more than appearin the institutional history as
a "contingenc[y] of the original context of emergence,"'7 as Habermas
would have it. These customs and customary forms have the kind of
force Habermas accords to the "de facto legitimacy" of convention and
intimidation, not simply as contents of the 'unproblematic background'
for adjudication. 76 The common law and its residual presence in American law permits and sustains forms and practices which have neither the
character of "mutual recognition" nor the legitimacy of democraticallyderived norms, which for Habermas are the matter applied in adjudication.77 Law is perhaps a kind of "transmission belt,"7" but of conventions
attended merely by "de facto legitimacy" rather than democratic norms.
American law is in this sense "pre-modern" under Habermas's description: the separation of positive law and custom or convention Habermas
attributes to modern law79 does not characterize the American system.
B. ConstitutionalLaw in a Common Law Context
It is a commonplace of American constitutional law scholarship that
the U.S. Constitution can be understood as a 'superstatute' and, on the
other side, that it is nothing of the sort. Construed as a statute, the Constitution fits neatly under the umbrella of 'enacted law.' Certainly the
Constitution is a kind of enactment, in some sense; just as certainly this
characterization does not capture its peculiarity of its life and importance
in the American system.
74. Id. at 29 (emphasis added); see also Simpson, supra note 5, at 374-75 (discussing the
effect of the repetition).
75. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 198.
76. See id. at 29; see also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
77. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 235.
78. Id. at 76; see also id. at 448 (stating that "[Law] functions as a kind of 'transmission belt'
that picks up structures of mutual recognitin that are familiar from face-to-face interactions and
transmits these, in abstract but binding form,to the anonymous, systematically mediated interaction
among strangers").
79. See id. at 106.
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In Constitutional Fate,80 Philip Bobbitt elaborates a theory of the
Constitution which suggests that the legitimacy of certain conventional
types of arguments is antecedent to, rather than founded upon, a theory
of the Constitution." Bobbitt claims that constitutional law is the relation
of these conventional forms of arguments.82 He ties the identity of the
American people to the particular set of conventional forms which make
up legitimate constitutional argument: "[the conventions] could be different, but . . . then we would be different."83 How have these conventions emerged as essential aspects of our constitutional system? In what
sense, if any, are they still conventional? That is, why should we suppose
that American constitutional law is still affected and pervaded by these
conventions?
Bobbitt's answer is that the initial forms of constitutional argument
have their origin in decisions made by the Framers, decisions which in
effect made the state a subject matter for the common law.' Previously,
in the English system, the common law was addressed to relations among
private persons (torts, property) and between private persons and the
state (common law crimes). The state was the source, not a subject, of
the common law. In framing the Constitution the drafters reversed this
relationship: the people became the source of the law, and the state became part of the subject matter. This entailed applying common law
forms-types of argument and certain processes-against the state.
These common law forms--conventions-are the source of the forms of

constitutional argument."
The emergence and falling away of legitimate forms of argument are,
in Bobbitt's picture, contingent, that is, they depend upon the type and
urgency of problems which arise and upon a series of choices we make
in addressing them. 6 Their origin is partly customary or conventional,
80. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
81. See id.at 5. Bobbitt describes six argument-forms: historical, textual, doctrinal, structural,
at 247. He also accounts for two "functions": cueing and expressing.
prudential, and ethical. See id.
Id. at 248. Both argument forms and functions are what Bobbitt calls conventions. See id.at 6.
82. See id.at 245. Note that Bobbitt does not reduce constitutional law to the conventions of
judges, because the conventions emerge from a participatory process. Bobbitt states:
Legal truths do exist within a convention. But the conventions themselves are only possible because of the relationship between the constitutional object--the document, its history, the decisions construing it--and the larger culture with whom the various constitutional functions serve to assure a fluid, two-way effect on the on-going process of constitutional meaning. We have, therefore, a participatory Constitution.
Id. at 234-35.
83. Id. at 6.
84. Telephone interview with Phillip Bobbitt, author, CONSTrrunONAL FATE (Mar. 30, 1999).
85. See id.
86. See BOBBITT, supra note 80, at 238 (quoting John Wheeler and discussing the following
example: in a game of twenty questions, the assembled answerers decide not to pick a certain word
for a questioner sent out of the room, but rather to answer each of his questions in a way which
suggests an answer consistent with all previous answers, all the while narrowing the field of possibilities each by his or her own choice even though thai choice is not for a definite word selection but
rather of a particular direction in a particular instance).
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lying as it does in the forms of the common law, and their new life as
forms of constitutional argument is also, according to Bobbitt, entirely
conventional." Constitutional adjudication transpires in a context of a
"competition of arguments," 8 but unlike Habermas's "free exchange" of
arguments, 9 this competition is constrained by conventional limits on the
set of legitimate arguments, something which would take constitutional
adjudication in Bobbitt's account out from under at least the ideal form
of Habermas's notion of adjudication.'e Finally, the six forms of argument taken together can come into conflict in a particular case, and do
not by themselves guarantee particular outcomes.9 In Bobbitt's theory of
the Constitution, legitimate forms of argument do not yield single right
answers.92 However, they are thereby no less legitimate.9 3
According to Bobbitt, "the very functioning of the argumentative
modes works to insure that there is consensus among those persons operating within the conventions." 4 Central both to Holmes's and to Bobbitt's
theory of adjudication is the notion of consensus embedded in custom or
convention. This supposition is vitally and persistently controversial in
American jurisprudence. Objections range themselves under two general
heads, on the one hand arguing that this consensus is fictional and that
law is a cover for social dissensus95 or, on the other, granting that it exists
and arguing that it relies on a kind of uncritical complacency by a mystified and distracted populace." Critics see ideological maneuvering in the
place of this 'emergent consensus'; defenders defend the consensus as an
aspect of the 'rule of law.'97
In this very controversy, however, we can see the importance of the
residue of common law culture, what I will call here the 'custom of custom,' in the American constitutional system and in American adjudica87.

See id. at 8.

88.

Id. at 233.

89. HABERMAS, supranote 1, at 235.
90. See id. at 30. So that, for example, it is a matter of convention in Bobbitt's account that
arguments based on religion or kinship are not legitimate. See BOBBITT, supra note 80, at 6. For
Habermas, the irrelevance of these kinds of arguments is instead a matter of the separation of positive law from life-world forms in the modem world. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 106.
91. See supra notes 8-34 and accompanying text. Habermas's judge, Hercules, J. after the
retro-fit with a theory of legal argumentation, would push beyond the limits of the available conventional forms (which show up merely as contents of the facticity of the relevant institutional history)
to a communicatively-achieved decision about the rights of the parties. Bobbit's judge relies on a
specialized form of conscience to resolve incommensurable conclusions from the particular argument-forms. See generally PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
92. See BOBBrrr, supra note 91.
93. On the distinction between legitimacy and justification, see id.
94. Id. at245.
95. Cf David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36
STAN. L. REV. 575, 578 (1984).
96. See id. at 589-91.
97. For a recent treatment of these controversies, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION (1997).
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tion in general. Even if one disputes a claim to an actual moral or political consensus behind conventional or customary forms, one may nevertheless grant that in the American system there exists'some kind of consensus-however undesirable-in the very functioning of such conventions or customs. Or, if one disputes even this claim to a de facto or weak
consensus in constitutional and common law forms, one must concede
that the object of one's critique is the resistance that these forms and
practices have to social movements or to social criticism." In both of
these objections as well as in the counterarguments advanced by those
who defend the notion of consensus, the residual culture of customary
and common law forms and processes is essential. This residue has a
status in American law today that the requirement of a wax seal for important documents possessed in the time long after the widespread illiteracy contemporaneous with the Norman conquest-the basis of the requirement of the seals--had disappeared." Common law forms and the
elaboration through custom they carry with them are themselves now
customary in American law: judges resort to and refine them and innovate on their terms, legislative and other enactments are invariably subject to interpretation and elaboration on these terms, and they shape and
influence the drafting of enacted law. Even on a critical reading of theories of American adjudication and constitutional law, the 'custom of
custom'-the customary residue of conventional forms-is an element
which must be taken into account in any theoretical treatment of American law.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CULTURE OF CUSTOM FOR A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW

Construed as it is in Between Facts and Norms as a modem legal
system, American law in Habermas's picture does not appear with this,
its most important and enduring aspect, namely, the residue of the culture
of the common law or as I have called it here, the 'custom of custom'.
The central problem of modem legal theory for Habermas, viz. the tension between facticity and validity, appears only upon the separation
between positive law and life-world forms that arrives with modernity."t °
This separation is not realized in the American legal system. The culture
of the common law that pervades and supports so much of the adjudication, enactment, and application of American law renders the attribution
of such a separation premature. On this argument, the theory of law presented in Between Facts and Norms confronts several difficulties in its
application to the American system, which I will only enumerate here.

98.
99.

See id. at 2.
Albert Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 40 (1996) (quoting

Blackstone: "which custom continued when learning had made its way among them through the
reason for doing it had ceased").
100. See HABERMAS, supra note 1,at 106.
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First, as we can see in a comparison of Habermas's view of what
judges do with the picture of the American judge drawn in Part III, adjudication in American law, shot through as it is with customary forms and
processes, is something altogether unlike the communicatively committed justice of Between Facts and Norms. Second, the results of the efforts
of Habermas's judge have a status as outcomes which is very different
from that of the products of the American judge: decisions in American
courts contribute to the elaboration and interpretation-accretion of statutes and lines of case law in the incremental, circumstantial, and openended way suggested by Holmes' story of the emergence of rules.' ' New
decisions take on the dual status of settled and tentative possessed by the
earlier decisions which shaped the subsequent outcomes in turn. The
decisions of Habermas's judge, on the other hand, join the body of enacted and vestigially traditional "web" of institutional history in relation
to which, as facticity, subsequent decisions must be consistent." His
decision in a particular case becomes part of the inert content of that institutional history, inert, that is, in the sense that as an elaboration of existing law it is finished, complete, so it can serve to inform-but not in
any organic or uncontemplated fashion to shape-the deliberative processes of subsequent judges communicatively constrained.
Third, this construction of existing law as "facticity" in relation to
which the "validity" of law is in tension and to both of which adjudication is a reconciliation leaves the dynamic, as well as the emergent, varilaw out of the picture altogether. The "web" is
ety in existing
"opaque,"' 3 that is, although the peculiarity of the origin of a particular
part of the institutional history may be apparent in that history, it is not
permitted in its peculiarity to affect judicial outcomes differently than
other types of institutional history. For Habermas's judge, facticity is a
homogeneous constraint, without variety or even "gravitational force"'"
in its effect on outcomes. Further, casting all of existing law as facticity
and setting it in tension in modem legal systems with "validity" or legitimacy is to overlook--quite rightly, given Habermas's picture of the
emergence of the modem from the pre-modem world-the legitimacy of,
for example, common law forms and processes, that is, of customary
law. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the legitimacy of the results of adjudication in the American system is neither a modem "validity" nor a reconciliation-based communicative legitimacy but rather the de facto legitimacy Habermas assigns to traditional customary or otherwise circumstantial law.
Fourth, the location of the legitimacy of judicial outcomes in the
American system with the 'custom of custom' as I have suggested here
101.
102.
103.
104.

See supranotes 47-79 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 8-34 and accompanying text.
HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 198.
DWORKIN, supranote 16, at 115.
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poses problems for the relationship Habermas would draw between democracy and the rule of law. In particular, the role of the U.S. Constitution in the application of this part of the theory to American law is rendered problematic by the alternate view, suggested in Part III.B, that the
Constitution itself is steeped in and relies substantially on common law
forms and processes. Further complication is introduced by the permeation of legislative processes by vestigial common law form. To the extent
that such a system cannot be said to be rational, American constitutional
law falls outside the view of this relationship."l That is, it is unlikely that
we would say of the American constitutional system "that there is a conceptual or internal relation, and not simply a historically contingent association, between the rule of law and democracy."" 6 Philip Bobbitt's view
of the very nature of the Constitution and of constitutional law suggests-at least in the first instance--quite the opposite. 7
Finally, a review of contemporary American jurisprudential debates
cannot be complete, or on target, without some sense of the stakes involved in the (celebrated or reviled) tenacity with which the 'custom of
custom' or the residual culture of common law forms and processes pervade and sustain American law in all its parts and aspects. On this point,
as with the four which precede it, I would emphasize the following distinction for American readers of Professor Habermas's legal theory: if
Between Facts and Nonns is intended as regards American law as a descriptive account, it does well to note the role of common law culture in
the law itself, and of controversies attendant upon it in American legal
scholarship. If, on the other hand, the theory is prescriptive or hortatory
in its aim, I would suggest that it needs to be refocused for the American
context to take account of this most important aspect.

105. Because judicial decision making is bound to law and legal statutes, the rationality of
adjudication depends on the legitimacy of existing law, This legitimacy hinges in turn on the rationality of a legislative process that, under the conditions of the constitutional separation of powers, is
not at the disposal of agencies responsible for the administration of justice.
HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 238.
106. Id. at 449.
107. See supra Part 1l.B.

